Stephen Monteiro
From Aristotle’s “De Anima; or Περι Ψυχης”
For this translation I have employed the Oxonii, Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis, ed. W.D. Ross, 1956. I have looked to the Basic Works, Random House, as a guide in certain sentences.
Concerning the Soul, Book 1:
Since we are seizing from under (comprehending) the knowledge of the noble and the honorable—one [of which] more than the other, either by accuracy, or, rather, (with respect to being) more beautiful and even more theatrical[1], is better—through both a these a well-reasoned (“well-logiced”) inquiry concerning the soul should we stand together (synthesize) in the first things. As it seems then, quite well for truth altogether, the knowledge of this lays the foundations together[2], as most of all toward nature. For it is such a thing as a principle of living things.[3] We should seek to theorize (to know as by sight) and to know (as through a measuring judgment) the nature and essence of the soul and what, with regard to the soul, is accidental. I do wonder if the sentence could be rendered such that nature and essence might be accidental, though logically this seems impossible[4]; which do seem to be peculiar sufferings (affections) of the soul, and which (seem to be the affections) through each thing and (what seems) to belong to living things. In all things and in all ways then to seize something with confidence (“with faith”) concerning the soul is of the most difficult things. For even since those seeking are in common and with many others, I say of this concerning the essence and what it is, it should seem that there is some one method for all thing concerning which essence we wish to know, just as even a demonstration of the particular things for the accidents (things that happen to be), so that one much seek what should be this here method. For if it is not some one and common method concerning what this is, then to work laboriously becomes a most difficult thing; For it will be necessary to seize some turn concerning each thing. Whenever it should be apparent, insofar as whether is it a demonstration of diagram or even some other method, then it hold many quandries and wanderings, out of some it is necessary to seek. As there are other principles for other things, just as of numbers and of plane figures.
First perhaps constrained[5] to loosen through (answer) in what genos (kind of thing) [the soul is] and what it is, I say then whether this here thing is even some essence or quality (what kind) or quantity (how much) or some other one of the categorized choosen apart (distinquished); and then whether it is of the beings in power or rather some end-in-hand; for it bears across (is different) from that which is some small thing. One must spy then even if there are pieces or without pieces, and whether the soul is same-formed (homogenous) altogether or not. If not homogenous, whether [the parts] bear across (differ) in for or in kind. Until now then Those speaking (logicking) and seeking concerning the soul found it fit to epsy (examine) concerning man alone. One must seize well how, lest it escape his notice, whether there is one logic of this same thing, according for those of living things, or according to each another [logic], for example[6] of horse, of dog, of man, of God: as the one is nothing other than the living thing according to the whole (universally); or is so later. Similarly, if even something in common would be categorized as another. Then, if not many souls, but parts[7], whether it is necessary (δ) to seek prior the material soul or the parts. It is difficult even to define of these what kind (qualities) have been born (natured) as others from others[8], and whether one ought[9] to seek prior the parts or the works of these same [parts], such as to cognize or the mind, and to sense or the sensation[10]; and similarly for the others. If prior the works, and would be back again to puzzle (as some quandary), then one must seek if there are things laying against (correlative) of these, such as the things sensed of the sensation, and the thing cognized of the mind. It is likely that it is not only useful to know what it is for theorizing the causes of the accidents (things that happen to be) for the essences[11] (just as [one might ask] in mathematics [if it is useful to know] what is the right angle and the curvilinear, or what is the straight line and the plane, for knowing by sight the equal angles of the triangles to the right-angled sort) but even conversely the great piece lies together the accidents for knowing what it is; since then even we are able to give forth according to the imagination[12] concerning the accidents, or in all ways, or of the many things, we will certainly be able to say the most noble things concerning the essences; In all demonstrating the principle is what it is; since by the sort of definitions that do not happen to measure out the accidents, and as well never are easy to make a likeness concerning this same thing, it is manifest that they [this other sort of definition] ask dialectically and are all together vapid.
[1] That is, more worthy of sight and contemplation. Further this sentence could be clarified by rearranging the clauses, though I must say, it is still open to a certain amount of ambiguity: "
[2] A more fluid rendering might be: “As it seems then the knowledge of the soul moves itself toward truth all together so well, and as (it seems) best toward nature.”. Liddel & Scott provides us with the more scholastic “laying the foundations together”. Most literally, we could say the knowledge “throws itself together” toward truth all together.
[3] I have translated this sentence three times at different stages in my career with Aristotle. I am very much so confused with this simple sentence now more than ever. It could me “such a thing as”, but Aristotle uses this word, which we also equate as “example”. Thus, this short simple declarative sentence might inform us of how we read all of “Concerning the Soul”. That is, it is not clear how we should take the soul as an example. An inclination I hesitate away from interprets this sentence to mean: the soul represents metaphorically how the principles of the living things manifest themselves. Thus, the soul might not be real, but is a general, a law if you will, of how things become living things; in the same way one might argue that a mathematical equation describes the pathway of motion, not the moving body itself.
[4] More Literally: We should seek to theorize (to know through sight) and to know (as through a measuring judgement) both the nature of this same thing and the essence, whether there is some sort that happens to be concerning this same thing. Parentheticals are employed to emphasize etymological subties.
[5] Up until this point Aristotle employs a different kind of necessity in his treatise. Previously he has used δει, which implies a need, particularly a need to do something as by divine law. Now he uses Αναγκαιον, which it associated with strangulation. Thus, we might thing of it as bound by natural limitations. I do not know of a fitting word to render the distinctions between necessities (further, adjs ending with τεον occupy my rendering to “must”). As a result, I will include, from now on a parenthetical with an α or a δ as an abbreviated distinction.
[6] This is the same word as the previous footnote, using the alternate of “such as”.
[7] The distinction between pieces and parts I will not describe. I simply wish to emphasize this distinction in Aristotle’s usage. “Part”, though, can also be translated as “fate”.
[8] I do not know of a smooth way to translate this literally. Aristotle is using two different forms of other.
[9] Another form of necessity with a feeling of want or use, χρη. From here on out distinguished with (χ) if necessary.
[10] To capture Aristotles’ usage more exactly, one might translate these examples as: To mind or the mind, and to sense and the sensation.
[11] I would really like input on why essences in the dative. If anybody has speculations one why Aristotle chose the cases of these words as he did, tell me about it.
[12] Some translations soften this to experiences or appearances, but i think it should be taken quite strongly.
